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THE RIGHT OF THE ALIEN TO BE INFORMED OF
DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES BEFORE
ENTERING A PLEA OF GUILTY
OR NOLO CONTENDERE
The Immigration and Nationality Act provides for deportation
of aliens convicted of specified crimes. Frequently, alien defen-
dants offer guilty pleas unaware-or misinformed-that they
thereby subject themselves to potential deportation. Traditionally,
courts have not had to inform defendants of deportation conse-
quences. Deportation, however, can be devastating to the alien and
his family. This Comment suggests that a plea is not fully volun-
tary if offered unaware of such serious implications. Courts
should be required to inform alien defendants of deportation con-
sequences before accepting pleas of guilty.
INTRODUCTION
Alien residents1 of the United States encounter two separate
modes of punishment when convicted of certain crimes. They, as all
citizens, are first subject to the criminal sentence meted out by the
criminal justice system. In addition, they then become vulnerable to
the myriad consequences that arise from various specified convic-
tions, chief of which for the alien is deportation. 2 Given the enor-
mous consequences for the alien and his family that result from such
convictions, 3 it is anomalous to the American judicial system that
the alien, his attorney, and even the court frequently are unaware of
the resultant and often inevitable deportation proceeding that arises
from the alien's conviction.4
1. The Immigration and Nationality Act defines an alien as "any person not a
citizen or national of the United States." Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(3),
8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(3) (1982).
2. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
3. For example, upon conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, such as
petty theft or simple fraud, an alien can be subject to near imminent deportation, even
though the actual sentence is slight, or even suspended.
4. For a discussion of the alien facing criminal charges see generally Bastone,
What Every Attorney Who Defends a Criminal Case Should Know-and Usually
Doesn't-About the Immigration and Nationality Act, 22 B.B.J. 3, 17 (1978); Hol-
lander, Defending the Criminal Alien in New Mexico: Tactics and Strategy to Avoid
Deportation, 9 N.M.L. REV. 45 (1978-1979).
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The alien's plea to a criminal charge assumes critical dimensions
for three primary reasons. First, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
is itself a conviction.5 Second, an overwhelming number of convic-
tions arise not from actual trial proceedings, but from offered and
accepted pleas of guilty.6 Third, aliens commonly offer pleas of
guilty without any awareness that they are thereby subjecting them-
selves to possible deportation.
Studies have estimated that as many as ninety-five percent of all
criminal cases result in guilty pleas,1 a substantial number of which
are induced by plea bargains or discussions.8 Moreover, defendants
frequently plead guilty while believing in or maintaining their inno-
cence.9 The evidence against an accused can be so considerable that
the offer of a lesser charge or the likelihood of a reduced or sus-
pended sentence appears to be in his best interest. 10 The United
States Supreme Court, in North Carolina v. Alford,"' has held that
5. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). "A plea of guilty is more than
a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction;
nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment." See infra note 134
(plea of nolo contendere tantamount to conviction).
6. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. II advisory committee notes [hereinafter cited as
Advisory Notes]: "Administratively, the criminal justice system has come to depend
upon pleas of guilty and, hence, upon plea discussions;" BoND, PLEA BARGAINING AND
GUILTY PLEAS, § 1.2 (2d ed. 1983); NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF
GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 (1966).
7. E.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY, 1-2 (Approved Draft 1968);
1976 DIRECTOR OF THE AD. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 360 table D-4 (of 40,112
convictions, 34,041 were by pleas of guilty or nolo contendere).
8. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE AD. OF JUST.-TASK
FORCE ON THE AD. OF JUST., TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 9 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].
The question of guilt or innocence is not contested in the overwhelming majority
of criminal cases. A recent estimate is that guilty pleas account for 90 percent
of all convictions; and perhaps as high as 95 percent of misdemeanor
convictions.
A substantial percentage of guilty pleas are the product of negotiations between
prosecutor and defense counsel or the accused.
Id.
9. PRESIDENT'S COMM4'N supra note 8, at 11. "The most troublesome problem is
the possibility that an innocent defendant may plead guilty because of the fear that he
will be sentenced more harshly if he is convicted after trial or that he will be subjected to
damaging publicity of a repugnant charge."
10. FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(e)(1)(A).(C) provides that the government, in exchange
for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, can (1) move for dismissal of other charges; (2)
make a recommendation or agree not to oppose the defendant's request for a particular
sentence; or (3) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of a given
case.
11. 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). But cf. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 41(D.C. Cir. 1982) which says:
The serious consequences of involuntary deportation ... clearly [demonstrate]
how the threat of deportation could be abused during plea negotiations. It can
readily be imagined that some resident aliens might prefer to avoid even the risk
of deportation rather than stand trial for crimes of which they believe them-
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it is not a denial of due process for a defendant to offer a plea of
guilty while maintaining his innocence. The Court, however, has not
yet specifically addressed the unique problem faced by aliens who
offer pleas of guilty or nolo contendere in ignorance of potential de-
portation consequences resulting from their plea.
Conduct Leading to Deportation
The United States Immigration and Nationality Act specifies
nineteen grounds for deporting aliens.12 For purposes of this Com-
ment, several are especially relevant since convictions for conduct in
these delineated areas may cause the alien to be susceptible to later
deportation proceedings with sometimes certain deportation conse-
quences. These areas include crimes involving moral turpitude,13
crimes relating to narcotic drugs, 4 crimes involving the illegal entry
or the smuggling of aliens into the United States,15 crimes connected
with prostitution,' and certain weapons violations.' 7
When deportation does follow from a violation of one of the enu-
merated grounds, the ramifications for the alien can be severe, if not
devastating. Justice Black, for example, emphasized that the alien
"loses his job, his friends, his home, and maybe even his children,
who must choose between their father and their native country."'
An illustrative case is Garcia-Gonzalez v. Immigration and Natural-
ization Service."9 The defendant, a self-supporting Mexican woman,
had lived in the United States for nearly fifty years, having come to
America when she was only nine years old. She pleaded guilty to a
charge of unlawful possession of heroin and was sentenced to three
years probation, six months incarceration and a fine of $1,000, an
inconsequential penalty in light of the ensuing deportation order.20
selves innocent.
12. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(1)-(19), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)-
(19) (1982).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1982).
14. Id. at § 1251(a)(11).
15. Id. at § 1251(a)(2), (13).
16. Id. at § 1251(a)(12).
17. Id. at § 1251(a)(14).
18. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 533 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting).
19. 344 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965).
20. Id. at 805. The deportation order was upheld even though section 1203.4 of the
California Penal Code allowed her to withdraw her guilty plea upon completion of the
probation sentence, and provided for dismissal of the accusation and release from all
penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense. Id. at 806. See also United States ex
reL Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1926), in which an alien was deported to
Poland after spending the greater part of his life in the United States, even though he
Focus of Comment
Given the frequency of guilty pleas and the often harsh resulting
consequences, several concerns unique to the alien defendant emerge.
First, how should courts treat those instances when the alien, una-
ware of potential deportation consequences, offers a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere? Second, how should courts approach those cases in
which the alien has been misadvised or misinformed by his counsel
regarding the deportation consequences of his plea? Five basic fac-
tors are involved in dealing with these two questions of increasing
national concern: (1) the common law understanding of what consti-
tutes a voluntary plea, (2) the requisites of a voluntary plea under
the constitutional safeguard of due process, (3) the effect of direct
and indirect consequences upon the voluntariness of the plea, (4) the
possible manifest injustice in not allowing withdrawal of the plea,
and (5) the constitutional entitlement to effective assistance of coun-
sel. Unfortunately, American jurisdictions disagree as to the appro-
priate approach to take when confronted by an alien facing criminal
charges. Moreover, considerable lack of consensus exists regarding
the very nature of these factors themselves. This Comment will ex-
amine whether the alien's plea made without full information is truly
voluntary, as well as the factors involved in allowing withdrawal of
the plea when offered by an uninformed or misinformed defendant
alien.
VOLUNTARINESS OF THE PLEA
Rule 11
In Kercheval v. United States,21 the United States Supreme Court
posited the oft-cited standard for the voluntariness of the guilty plea.
The Court explained: "[O]ut of just consideration for persons ac-
cused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be
accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full
understanding of the consequences. 22 However, the Court provided
the lower courts neither specific guidelines regarding what advice
was required nor of what consequences the defendant needed an un-
derstanding. In McCarthy v. United States,25 the Court pronounced
its endorsement of the requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal
had no friends in that country and could not speak the language.
21. 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
22. Id. at 223. See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970): "That a
guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and discernment has
long been recognized.. . . Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary
but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant cir-
cumstances and likely consequences." (Footnotes omitted).
23. 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969).
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Procedure Rule 11, as they existed under the 1966 amendment,
which compelled the trial judge to personally address the defendant
in ascertaining whether he understood the consequences of the plea.
However, it was not until Boykin v. Alabama24 that the Court gave
constitutional dimensions to the minimum information a defendant
had to be given before his plea could be accepted by a state trial
court. Explaining that courts must exercise the greatest care to as-
sure that the accused has a full understanding of the plea's implica-
tions and consequences,25 the Boykin Court enumerated three basic
constitutional rights waived by offering a plea of guilty: first is the
privilege against self-incrimination; second, the right to trial by jury;
and third, the right to confront one's accusers.2" The requirement of
Boykin that a defendant must be apprised that a plea of guilty
waives these rights was subsequently codified by the 1975 amend-
ment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(c). 27
Rule 11(c) thus delineates the minimum advice a court must pro-
vide the defendant before accepting his plea. This minimum does not
encompass, however, collateral consequences such as deportation. In-
deed, the Advisory Notes to Rule 11 directly reject imposing a duty
upon the trial courts to inform defendants of collateral consequences.
Citing parole eligibility as an example, the Advisory Committee
commented that it would be unrealistic to expect a judge to have a
basis for advice regarding such collateral consequences of a guilty
plea in a given case.28 The Committee did, however, recognize the
24. 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
25. Id. at 243-44.
26. Id. at 243.
27. Advisory Notes, supra note 6, commenting on Rule 11(c), state: "The amend-
ment identifies more specifically what must be explained to the defendant and also codi-
fies, in the rule, the requirement of Boykin v. Alabama which held that a defendant must
be apprised of the fact he relinquishes certain constitutional rights by pleading guilty."
(Citation omitted).
Rule 11(c) requires the trial court to inform the defendant of, and ascertain that he
understands, five specific points before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere: (1)
the nature of the charge and the maximum and minimum penalty possible, (2) the right
of the defendant to be represented by counsel, who, if necessary, may be appointed by
the court, (3) the right of a defendant to plead not guilty, the right to a trial by jury, and
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, (4) the waiver of the right
to a trial if the defendant so pleads, and (5) the right of the court to question the ac-
cused, and the possibility that the answers to any court questions may be used against
him in prosecution for perjury or false statement. Section (d) requires the court to ascer-
tain that the plea is voluntary; section (f) compels the court, before accepting a plea of
guilty, to be satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea; and section (g) requires a
verbatim record of the court's advice and inquiry. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c), (d), (f), (g).
28. Id.
critical nature of some collateral consequences and added that what
was required to conform to Boykin "is left to future case-law
development. 12
More problematic is section (d) of Rule 11, which requires the
accused's plea to be fully voluntary. The language of the rule is
vague and has generated much discussion regarding the requisites of
a voluntary plea. Brady v. United States30 formulated the presently
well-accepted standard among the federal courts as to the parame-
ters of voluntariness: a plea is voluntary if the defendant is "fully
aware of the direct consequences." 31 On this basis, a trial court must
advise the accused of all direct consequences, but has no such obliga-
tion to inform of collateral consequences. This, of course, does not
resolve the problem, for no concise formulation exists concerning
what constitutes a "direct consequence" and what constitutes a "col-
lateral consequence."
Collateral consequences, of which a defendant need not be ap-
prised to offer a valid plea, have variously included suspension from
29. Id. See also Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearing on Federal Rules
and Criminal Procedure Amendments Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary. 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 151-52 (1975) (statement of Prof. Wayne LeFave, on behalf of the
Judicial Conference of the United States):
The more fundamental point is that advice to the defendant at the time of his
plea, in terms of its length and character, should be stated in a way which will
be most meaningful to the defendant. Boykin mentions but three constitutional
rights, but there are a great many more which are waived by a plea of guilty.
. . . It is to be doubted that a litany of all these rights would be meaningful to
the typical defendant. In the view of the Advisory Committee it is not desirable
to mandate a judge to go through a long ritual which tends to get automatic and
routine. Rather, within the limits allowed by the law, a judge should be given
flexibility to accomplish the objective of the rule, namely, that of ensuring that
the defendant is making an informed plea. In almost all cases, defendants are
represented by counsel who should share with the judge the responsibility for
informing the defendant of the consequences of his action. In the event that a
judge, in an individual case, fails to inform a defendant on an important conse-
quence of his plea, there is opportunity to raise the issue in the court of appeals.
There is nothing in the rule, as proposed, which prevents the judge from adding
other advice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the advisory note states: 'What is re-
quired, in this respect, to conform to Boykin is left to future case-law
development.'
(Emphasis added).
30. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
31. The standard as to the voluntariness of guilty pleas must be essentially
that defined by Judge Tuttle of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, includ-
ing the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor,
or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats. . misrepresentations
. . . or perhaps promises that are by their nature improper as having no rela-
tionship to the prosecutor's business.
Id. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd,
246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd per curiam on confession of error, 356 U.S. 26
(1958)).
200
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one's position as a firefighter,82 commitment to a mental institution, 3
possible imposition of consecutive sentences," loss of the right to
vote and to obtain a passport to travel abroad,35 loss of voting rights
in another state,36 possible undesirable discharge from military ser-
vice,37 sentence enhancements,38 and loss of good time credits.3 9
The Federal Standard: United States v. Parrino
Since 1954, United States v. Parrino" has been the controlling
case on the right of aliens to be informed of possible deportation
consequences arising from a conviction. From this case emerged two
elemental principles that have had an enormous impact on the fate
and lives of aliens: First, defendants need not be apprised of collat-
eral consequences, such as deportation. Second, misadvice or misin-
formation by defense counsel regarding such consequences does not
constitute an injustice such as would require a post-conviction with-
drawal of the plea.41
In Parrino, the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy
to kidnap in reliance on the assurance of his counsel, a former Com-
missioner of Immigration, that his plea would not subject him to de-
portation. Following his conviction, however, a deportation proceed-
ing was initiated against him. Consequently, he filed a post-sentence
motion under Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure to vacate the judgment and withdraw his earlier plea. The Par-
rino court rejected this claim, stating that a defendant's mere sur-
prise at the severity of the sentence imposed after the plea does not
present a manifest injustice that requires a court to vacate the judg-
ment and to allow the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea. 2
Moreover, in this instance, the nature of the surprise was not the
32. United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
995 (1976).
33. Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 1005 (1973).
34. United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 911 (1971).
35. Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
916 (1965).
36. United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963).
37. Redwine v. Zuckert, 317 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
38. United States v. Garrett, 680 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1982).
39. Hutchison v. United States, 450 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 1971).
40. 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954).
41. Id. at 921-22. See infra note 77 for the text of Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 32(d) and discussion of the withdrawal of a guilty plea.
42. Id.
severity of the sentence directly flowing from the judgment of the
trial court, but a collateral consequence of the judgment-deporta-
tion.43 This reasoning assumes the alien's plea to be voluntary, even
though he relied on the erroneous advice of his attorney, a presumed
expert on immigration matters, that his plea would not result in de-
portation. The court, in rejecting both severity and surprise as fac-
tors to be considered, based its conclusion on the "collateralness" of
a deportation proceeding. Indeed, the majority did not even discuss
the issue of voluntariness. Nevertheless, Parrino has been controlling
for the past thirty years.
Judge Frank, in his noted dissent, argued that the classification
"collateral consequence" was rather arbitrarily employed. 4" His posi-
tion was that while deportation was not technically a criminal pun-
ishment, it may nevertheless be more devastating upon the defendant
than the actual sentence: "For all practical purposes, the court sen-
tenced him to serve (a) two years in jail and (b) the rest of his life in
exile."'45 The Judge even averred that Rule 32(d) might apply to
such instances of deportation, even though such a penalty was not
imposed directly by the judge in the criminal proceeding. This fact
should not preclude, according to Frank, the existence of a "manifest
injustice."' "4
The majority in Parrino conceded that deportation can have a se-
vere impact on the defendant's life and family, but it drew a distinc-
tion between the criminal proceeding and the separate civil proceed-
ing initiated under the Immigration and Nationality Act.4 7 The
Parrino majority insisted that notwithstanding the harsh inflexibility
of the Act, it could not let sympathy encroach into the field of the
criminal process." Judge Frank responded that when a rule such as
Rule 32(d) suggests in plain words to avoid "manifest injustice,"
courts should embrace the opportunity and "not extend earlier deci-
sions to escape it."'49
Judge Frank's second objection to the majority decision in Parrino
was its failure to recognize a manifest injustice when the defendant
entered his plea under misinformation provided him by his attorney.
The majority held that surprise resulting from the defendant's own
attorney did not constitute manifest injustice absent any clear show-
43. Id.
44. Id. at 924 (Frank, J., dissenting). "It has been said that (what my colleagues
term) 'collateral consequences,' if of importance, constitute such injustice. My colleagues
dispose of those statements as dicta. I am not sure of the propriety of that characteriza-
tion." Id. (footnote omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 922.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 926 (Frank, J., dissenting).
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ing of unprofessional conduct.6 0 Judge Frank took exception to this
position, asserting that courts have reversed convictions when a de-
fendant's counsel has been incompetent and when that incompetence
has seriously prejudiced the defendant.51 In the Parrino circum-
stance, Judge Frank regarded the defense counsel, who might easily
have checked the appropriate statutes regarding deportation, as
"egregiously derelict in the discharge of his duty to his client."52
Finally, the dissent questioned the value of a constitutional re-
quirement that a defendant have counsel before pleading guilty if
that counsel can then be utterly without legal competence to guide
his client. Judge Frank considered the giving of an erroneous opinion
by an attorney and the client's reliance on it in pleading guilty to be
an obvious "manifest injustice."5 Professor Moore concurs in this
position and notes that "the vigorous dissent of Judge Frank more
likely reflects the present attitude of the federal judiciary."" As is
subsequently discussed in this paper, Judge Frank's views are cur-
rently embraced in many state and federal court opinions, as well as
in legal commentary. 55
50. Id. at 921. Contra, Legomsky, The Alien Defendant: Sentencing Considera-
tions, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 136-37 (1977).
51. 212 F.2d at 925 (Frank, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 926. See also Legomsky, supra note 50 at 136-37.
54. 8A J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
32.07[3], (2d ed. 1983). Addressing the question of misinformation provided a defendant
by his attorney, Professor Moore writes:
[T]here is some confusion whether misrepresentations or misstatements of de-
fense counsel including a plea, not chargeable to the court or prosecution, may
justify withdrawal (though not serious enough to constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel under the Sixth Amendment). Since a determination of voluntariness
involves a subjective inquiry into the defendant's state of mind, the better rule
would permit withdrawal in the case of defense counsel's misrepresentations,
provided defendant reasonably relied upon them.
55. The small number of legal commentators that have dealt with deportation as a
consequence of the guilty plea invariably distinguish the seriousness of deportation from
lesser collateral consequences. See, e.g., Note, Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas in the Federal
Courts, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 366, 376 (1955): "A rarely litigated, though frequent, prob-
lem arises when counsel fails to warn the defendant of collateral consequences of convic-
tion such as loss of civil rights. . . and, perhaps more seriously, deportation or expatria-
tion." (Footnotes omitted). The same article takes issue with the Parrino decision, noting
that "[n]either the court not [sic] the dissent saw a constitutional issue in the case, but it
seems that perhaps counsel was so incompetent that his client was denied the constitu-
tionally guaranteed minimum due process." Id. at 377 (footnotes omitted). With regard
to the burden of warning the defendant of collateral consequences, the same writer
states, "This argument, however, is less persuasive where serious consequences, like de-
portation or expatriation, are involved." Id. at 378. Another author states:
Collateral consequences, on the other hand, need not be understood for the entry
of a voluntary plea.. . . The non-necessity of inquiry regarding a defendant's
Adherence to Parrino Among Federal Courts
The Parrino position has been followed steadfastly in several cir-
cuits. For example, in the Second Circuit this is demonstrated most
notably by United States v. Santelises" and Michel v. United
States.57 Michel, following Parrino, considered it unrealistic to com-
pel a trial court judge to compile a list of possible consequences or to
anticipate the multifarious contingencies which may affect one's civil
liberties. The Michel court, however, made no distinction between
the deprivation of one's various societal benefits and the loss of the
right to remain in the United States, but rather classified both as
peripheral contingencies.58
The Seventh Circuit, in an older case, not only held that the court
is not obligated to inform a defendant of possible deportation arising
from a guilty plea, but also found the alien defendant's contention to
the contrary "remarkable."' 9 The Third Circuit, while not dealing
directly with the question of deportation, has similarly referred to
deportation as a collateral consequence.6 0 Relying on Parrino, the
court remarked that it would be impractical to compel a trial judge
to inform an accused of such collateral eventualities.61 Also, the
Fourth Circuit, in its most recent decision in this area, has followed
Parrino and Michel in calling deportation a civil consequence which
is entirely collateral to the conviction.62 The court stressed defense
counsel's responsibility to inform the defendant of indirect and col-
lateral consequences. The court did not, however, address the ques-
appreciation for the collateral consequences of his plea seems well settled. What
constitutes a 'collateral' consequence remains obscure. For example, parole eligi-
bility is now characterized as a direct consequence, although once classified as a
collateral consequence about which a defendant need not be informed. Other
collateral consequences, deportation conspicuously, have chimerical character-
istics of 'directness' which may eventually lead to a similar shift in
classification.
Note, The Trial Judge's Satisfaction as to Voluntariness and Understanding of Guilty
Pleas, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 289, 320-21 (1970) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
56. 476 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1973).
57. 507 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1974).
58. Id. at 466.
59. United States ex rel. Durante v. Holton, 228 F.2d 827, 830 (7th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 963 (1956).
60. United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1956).
61. Id. The facts of this case are arguably distinguishable from those involving
deportation. Here, the defendant learned only after sixteen years that he would be de-
prived of the right to vote when he moved to a different jurisdiction. One can understand,
under these circumstances, the court's rationale for exclaiming that "unsolicited advice
concerning the collateral consequences of a plea which necessitates judicial clairvoyance
of a superhuman kind can be neither expected nor required." Id. Deportation, though, is
hardly a peripheral contingency nor does it require clairvoyance or superhuman foresight
to envisage such a possibility. See infra note 99.
62. United States v. Hillick, No. 75-1036, slip op. (4th Cir. Aug. 25, 1975) (avail-
able on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Cir file).
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tion of what the remedy should be, if any, when the attorney fails to
so inform his client.
Because the entire question of the voluntariness of the plea ap-
pears to depend on whether a consequence is characterized as direct
or collateral, the Fourth Circuit's attempt to define what constitutes
a direct consequence is instructive. In Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent
Institution,3 the court stated that the distinction "turns on whether
the result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic ef-
fect on the range of the defendant's punishment."" The Cuthrell
court, however, made no attempt to reconcile its rejection of deporta-
tion as a collateral consequence with its own definition, for, as
demonstrated, section 1251(a) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act provides for what is often tantamount to definite, automatic andimmediate deportation in a number of circumstances.65  If the
"largely automatic effect" or certainty were determining factors in
characterizing a consequence as direct, courts would necessarily have
to reclassify deportation-as well as other "so-called" collateral con-
sequences-as direct consequences. The confusion in ascertaining
what comprises a direct consequence is vividly reflected by the
Michel court's explicit rejection of the Cuthrell court's definition.
Although not referring to Cuthrell specifically, the Second Circuit
indicated it did not think the distinction between a direct and a col-
lateral consequence should depend upon the certainty with which the
sanction is meted out to the defendant.68
63. 475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1005 (1973). Though
Cuthrell did not involve a deportation, the court noted that the failure to inform an
accused of potential deportation consequences is merely a collateral factor which does not
render the plea invalid.
64. Id. at 1366.
65. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
66. 507 F.2d at 466. The court probably took this position because the defendant
had claimed that his deportation was, in fact, a direct consequence, not collateral. The
government, in refuting this argument, responded that it was not a direct consequence
because (1) deportation required a separate civil proceeding, and (2) deportation was not
automatic because 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2) provided that an alien could apply for "non-
priority status" on the basis of humanitarian factors which might thus result in suspen-
sion of deportation. Because 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2) requires that the alien have lived in
the United States for a period of at least ten years following the deportable act, this
eventuality suggested by the government is rather limited. It is not, therefore, surprising
that the court in Michel rejected the "certainty" of the sanction criterion; deportation in
such instances is a near certainty. It should be noted that what the government referred
to as "non-priority status" is an entirely different remedy from 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2),
and it, also, provides only limited relief. See, e.g., Hollander, supra note 4, at 65: "It
[deferred or nonpriority status] is a little used and little known remedy which is gener-
ally handled as an internal matter within the INS." See generally Wildes, The Nonpri-
ority Program of the Immigration and Naturalization Services Goes Public: The Litiga-
The question of deportation was one of first impression in
Fruchtman v. Kenton,6 7 a Ninth Circuit case. Attempting to provide
some guidelines, the Fruchtman court reasoned that a consequence
was direct if the actual sentence emanated from the court which had
accepted the plea originally. Conversely, a collateral consequence
was one originating under a different agency, beyond the control and
responsibility of the trial court judge.68 Accordingly, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held deportation a collateral consequence of which the trial
court has no obligation to inform an accused. 9 Applying this stan-
dard, neither the severity nor the certainty of the consequence would
be essential components affecting the voluntariness of the guilty plea.
This fact poignantly illustrates the danger in placing too great an
emphasis on the formal rubric under which specific consequences
should fall, and too little on the effect these consequences have upon
the voluntariness of the plea, which is, ultimately, the issue at hand.
The most recent decision holding against a defendant's right to be
advised of potential deportation is a Fifth Circuit case, Garcia-Trigo
v. United States.70 The facts of the case are significant because of
the severity of the "civil" consequences. On Friday, September 5,
1980, Fidel Garcia-Trigo was arrested by the United States Border
Patrol while driving a vehicle in which several other aliens were pas-
sengers. On the following Monday, September 8, he was told he was
to be charged only with the petty offense of "unlawfully entering the
United States by wading the river,"' 71 in violation of 8 U.S.C.§ 1325, rather than the more serious offense of transporting undocu-
mented aliens, which the officials had initially considered at the time
of the defendant's arrest. Garcia-Trigo pleaded guilty to this lesser
offense and was sentenced to sixty days in jail. The day after he
entered his plea of guilty, his wife informed the Border Patrol that
her husband was not an undocumented alien, but rather an author-
ized permanent resident who had lived in the United States for ten
years. Nevertheless, he was subject to deportation under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2) which provides for deportation of any alien who enters
the United States without inspection.
After serving his two month sentence, Garcia-Trigo sought to have
tive Use of the Freedom Act, 14 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 42 (1976).
67. 531 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976).
68. Id. at 949.
69. Id. The Ninth Circuit has recently reiterated this position in United States v.
Garrett, 680 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1982) (enhancement of sentence by another court was a
collateral consequence of a guilty plea).
70. 671 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1982). See United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 935
(5th Cir. 1979) (voicing strong opposition to informing defendants of collateral conse-
quences beyond those specifically enumerated by Rule 11, and holding Rule 11 require-
ments to be both "exclusive" and "inclusive").
71. 671 F.2d at 149.
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his conviction vacated by way of a Writ of Error Coram Nobis,712
asserting that the court had not strictly complied with the mandates
of Rule 11. He specifically claimed that the nature of the offense had
not been explained to him and that he had not been told of the con-
sequences of his guilty plea. The record indicated, however, that the
court had explained to him the dictates of Rule 11, translating them
into Spanish.73 The court rejected his arguments, asserting that col-
lateral attacks must show that one's fundamental rights were vio-
lated and also that there existed some present or prospective adverse
effect.7 The court found that the defendant's rights were not vio-
lated, nor, presumably, did separation from his spouse constitute the
requisite adverse effect. The court concluded that there had been
neither a complete miscarriage of justice nor a result inconsistent
with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure such as is required
for collateral relief.75 It held that Garcia-Trigo's rights were not seri-
ously prejudiced and that "the possible effect that his conviction of
this petty offense may have upon his immigration status is a collat-
eral 'consequence' that need not have been the subject of an explana-
tion to appellant at the time of arraignment and guilty plea." 76
72. The 1948 amendment to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
eliminated the use of the Writ of Error Coram Nobis in civil cases. Nevertheless, this
writ is still employed in criminal cases, and may provide the alien defendant an avenue of
attack in moving to withdraw an earlier guilty plea. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor,
648 F.2d 565, 570 n.14 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 866 (1981), which states:
"The common-law writ of error coram nobis is available by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)
(1976) (All Writs Statute), to correct errors of fact of such fundamental character as to
render the proceeding itself irregular and invalid." In Cline v. United States, 453 F.2d
873, 874 (5th Cir. 1972) the court said, "As we indicated in United States v. Morgan, a
writ of error coram nobis is an available remedy to correct fundamental errors in a crimi-
nal case, even though the sentence imposed has been served." In contrast to Garcia-
Trigo, this writ was successfully employed in People v. Wiedersperg, 44 Cal. App. 3d
550, 118 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1975) where the defendant was not aware that deportation
would result from her plea. The court indicated that a Writ of Error Coram Nobis may
be available when three requirements are met: (1) when there exists some fact, not
presented to the court on its merits, where such facts would prevent such judgment, (2)
when the newly discovered evidence does not go to the merits of the issues tried earlier,
and (3) when this evidence was neither known to the defendant, nor could have been
known at the time of making the plea. The court held that in the case of this Austrian
alien, all three factors applied; the motion for withdrawal of the pleas was granted.
73. Mr. Garcia-Trigo conceded that the court had explained various rights to him,
but because of confusion and embarrassment, he had not fully understood the nature of
the rights he was waiving. 671 F.2d at 149.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 149.
76. Id. at 150.
RECENT EROSION OF THE FEDERAL POSITION
Withdrawal of the Plea: Rule 32(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 2255
Although Parrino and its progeny held defendants need not be in-
formed of deportation consequences prior to offering a plea, this
stance has been recently challenged in several federal circuits. The
greatest signs of erosion appear, however, not within the requirement
of Rule 11 itself (although concerns are evident here also), but from
the application of Rule 32(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which allow for
withdrawal of pleas and vacating of judgments, respectively."7
77. Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "A motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is im-
posed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court
after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to
withdraw his plea." (Emphasis added).
Professor Wright notes that there is little difference between these two remedies:
There is considerable overlap between a post-sentence motion to withdraw a
plea of guilty for manifest injustice under Rule 32(d) and a motion to vacate a
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Motions under the statute have been treated
as if they were under the rule, and the standard for relief is usually treated as
being the same. Although there are cases that suggest that relief might be avail-
able under the rule when it would not be granted under the statute, there is no
indication that there is any actual difference in results.
3 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 539 (2d ed. 1982) (footnotes
omitted).
The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, in its preliminary draft, concurred with Wright's observation: "Indeed, it
may more generally be said that the results in § 2255 and 32(d) guilty plea cases have
been for the most part the same. Relief has often been granted or recognized as available
via either of these routes for essentially the same reasons . . . ." THE COMMITTEE ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (October, 1981), reprinted in 91 F.R.D. 289, 354 (1982). The
Committee proposed the following amendment to Rule 32(d):
PLEA WITHDRAWAL . . . If a motion . . . for withdrawal of a plea of
guilty or. . . nolo contendere. . . is made. . . before sentence is imposed, .
imposition of sentence is suspended, or disposition is had under 18 U.S.C. §
4205(c), the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the
defendant of any fair and just reason. . . . At any later time, a plea may be set
aside only on direct appeal or by motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Id. at 348-49. (Ellipses represent Committee's proposed deletions from present rule).
The amendment would eliminate the "manifest injustice" standard and make applica-
ble the standard that was formulated in Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962). 91
F.R.D. at 353. Accordingly, the standard for post-standard withdrawal of the guilty plea
would be, under Hill, if it is "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a com-
plete miscarriage of justice," or "an omission inconsistent with rudimentary demands of
fair procedure." Id. at 354 (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).
The standard for withdrawing a plea before sentence is imposed would be, by this
amendment, if it is "fair and just," which generally is the standard applied today. Profes-
sor Wright notes:
All agree that withdrawal of a guilty plea, even before sentencing, is not an
absolute right, but there is some disagreement on the standard to be applied at
that stage. Many cases teach that leave to withdraw should be freely granted if
it is before sentencing. This is often qualified, however, by saying that there
must be a 'fair and just' reason for withdrawing the plea.
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In a 1976 First Circuit case, Cordero v. United States,78 the de-
fendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming he did not know
deportation would follow, and that his attorney had told him he was
not guilty of the federal offense. The court regarded the standard for
withdrawing a pre-sentence plea to be whether there existed a fair
and just reason, and whether the trial court had abused its discretion
in denying the withdrawal under that standard. Deportation, the
court concluded, presented a close question and it thus expressed a
willingness to consider two factors: First, there was here no indica-
tion that the defendant was simply testing the weight of his potential
judgment; and second, there was a lack of evidence that the govern-
ment had been prejudiced by reliance on the earlier plea. The First
Circuit, in line with the Parrino, Michel, and Fruchtman courts, still
denoted deportation a collateral consequence, the potential of which
the court had no obligation to inform an accused, but, it stressed,
grounds might nevertheless be present which would constitute a fair
and just reason for withdrawing the plea. Accordingly, the Cordero
court acknowledged that a trial court, in its discretion, could prop-
erly grant leave to withdraw the plea when, as here, the defendant
was unaware of the ensuing deportation possibility.79 At the same
time, this court was cautious not to mandate a withdrawal, recogniz-
ing that in so doing, it would necessarily be adding a requirement to
the judicial proceeding-namely, warning defendants of possible de-
portation-thereby diluting the effect of Rule 11.80
The most significant departure from Parrino has occurred in the
District of Columbia Circuit, a change that has evolved perceptibly
over the past thirteen years. In a case often cited by other circuits,
United States v. Sambro,81 both the defendant and his attorney drew
erroneous conclusions concerning the potential consequences of de-
portation. The Sambro court followed Parrino and held that possible
ancillary or consequential results flowing from a conviction on a
guilty plea did not require a later withdrawal of that plea.82 The
defendant's erroneous conclusions about the effect probation would
have on deportation did not alter the voluntariness of his plea.83 Im-
Wright, supra at 198-99 (footnotes omitted).
78. 533 F.2d 723 (1st Cir. 1976).
79. Id. at 725-26.
80. Id. See infra note 155.
81. 454 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
82. Id. at 920.
83. Id. at 921. The Sambro majority considered it important that the defendant
and his counsel were aware of deportation consequences prior to making the plea, but
portant, however, because it presents a position recently embraced
by this same circuit,8 4 is the vigorous dissent by Judge Bazelon. He
considered the denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea a clear abuse of discretion. Emphasizing the American
criminal justice system's dependence on guilty pleas, which largely
come from plea bargains, the judge commented:
So long as we depend on a system that encourages defendants to waive their
constitutional rights, we have an obligation at least to ensure that defen-
dants do not waive their rights through ignorance, without full understand-
ing of the consequences. Surely poor, uneducated, or inexperienced people
are entitled to at least as much protection in negotiating pleas to criminal
charges, when liberty is at stake, as they are in negotiating ordinary com-
mercial transactions.85
Judge Bazelon recognized that courts have distinguished, for pur-
poses of Rule 11, between direct and collateral consequences and
that deportation might be appropriately classified as collateral.86 He
asserted, however, that it was a close question whether a plea could
be voluntary within the meaning of Rule 11 if the defendant did not
understand the deportation consequences of his plea.87 Consequently,
even if no specific advisement were required because of deportation's
collateralness, a court should still grant withdrawal of the plea under
Rule 32(d) if the "interest of justice so required." '88 Agreeing with
Judge Frank and Professor Moore, Judge Bazelon considered de-
fense counsel's misinformation to his client regarding deportation
consequences to present just such an interest of justice requiring
withdrawal of the guilty plea.89
A year earlier, in United States v. Briscoe,90 the same circuit ad-
dressed the question of misadvice by government counsel, but in that
discussion, the Briscoe court created the strong inference that misin-
formation by defense counsel could subject the guilty plea to a col-
lateral attack as well.9' Citing the drastic measures involved in de-
portation, the Briscoe court concluded that considerations of such
severe consequences may rightfully be included in one's decision to
had merely drawn wrong conclusions; that the defendant did not claim innocence, rather
a technical deficiency in the proceeding-lack of awareness of the deportation conse-
quences; and that the decision by a trial court to grant withdrawal of a plea is discretion-
ary. In this instance, no abuse of discretion was manifest.
84. See United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
85. 454 F.2d at 925 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 925-26.
87. Id. at 925.
88. See id. at 925-26.
89. Id. at 926-27.
90. 432 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
91. In Briscoe v. United States, 391 F.2d 984, 988 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Briscoe
1), the court noted, without deciding, that a mistake attributable to defense counsel
might provide for a plea's withdrawal on the basis that the defendant had been denied
his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
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plead guilty.9 2 The court held that a plea offered by a defendant
misled regarding deportation consequences may in appropriate cir-
cumstances be subject to attack.9 3 Concurring with both Judge
Frank and Professor Moore-a fact Judge Bazelon noted in his
Sambro dissent 91-the Briscoe court expressly rejected the Parrino
decision: "Insofar as a contrary view may be inferred from United
States v. Parrino on the ground that deportability is only a 'collat-
eral consequence' of conviction, we agree with Professor Moore: 'the
vigorous dissent of Judge Frank [in Parrino] more likely reflects the
present attitude of the federal judiciary.' 195
DRAMATIC SHIFT FROM THE Parrino TRADITION:
United States v. Russell
The Bazelon dissent in Sambro and the Briscoe discussion provide
a backdrop for United States v. Russell,96 the most recent federal
case dealing with deportation as a collateral issue. It also represents
the most decided shift to date away from the Parrino-based hold-
ings. The defendant in this case pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor
counts in response to the government's agreement to drop two felony
charges. He was subsequently sentenced to concurrent one-year jail
terms and three years probation, with all but one month of incarcer-
ation being suspended. 97 One month after sentencing, the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service initiated deportation proceedings
against him under 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(1 1). 8 The defendant immedi-
ately moved to have his sentence vacated and to withdraw his guilty
plea under Rule 32(d). He argued that he had not understood the
consequences of his plea, namely, that he would be subject to depor-
92. 432 F.2d at 1354.
93. Id. at 1353.
94. 454 F.2d at 926 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
95. 432 F.2d at 1353-54 (citations omitted). Although this case appears to re-
present a dramatic shift away from the Parrino reasoning, the holding was limited be-
cause the misrepresentation came, in part, from the government's counsel and there was
no showing that the defendant significantly relied upon the prosecutor's remarks regard-
ing deportation. Moreover, the court noted, when the misadvice has come from his coun-
sel, defendant cannot later claim involuntariness as long as the erroneous advice was
"within the general bounds of reasonable competence." Id. at 1353. This conclusion pro-
duces the further problem of ascertaining what comprises "reasonable competence." But
see supra text accompanying notes 50-51; see also Legomsky, supra note 50, at 136-37
which states: "Such findings [Parrino] are inexcusable. In an adversary system it is the
obligation of the attorney to assure the client the best defense possible under the law."
96. 686 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
97. Id. at 37.
98. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
tation based on the misdemeanor convictions.
The Russell court pointed out that American jurists are sharply
divided in their views concerning the penal nature of deportation.99
The court also noted that similar tensions exist regarding the classifi-
cation of deportation as a direct or collateral consequence. 100 The
D.C. Circuit conceded that well-established Rule 11 principles do
not require a court to inform a defendant of possible deportation.
But, it added, decisions guided by Rule 11 have improperly influ-
enced the application of Rule 32(d), which should be employed to
withdraw a plea in the interest of justice, even if the plea is validly
offered under the formal requirement of Rule 11.101
The court, in Russell, identified several considerations that should
guide district courts in their exercise of discretion in applying Rule
32(d). 02 The first is whether the defendant is attacking the earlier
plea on its merits, that is, whether the defendant is actually asserting
99. 686 F.2d at 38. See, e.g., Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) ("It is well
settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a
punishment."); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (Deportation
"is not a punishment."). Contra Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 479
(1963) ("[D]eportation is a drastic sanction, one which can destroy lives and disrupt
families."); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (Deportation is "close to punish-
ment."); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) (Deportation is a "drastic mea-
sure and at times the equivalent of banishient or exile . . . . It is the forfeiture for
misconduct of a resident in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty."); Fong Tan v.
Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (Deportation is a "penalty."); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (Deportation is the equivalent to the "loss of property and life; or
all that makes life worth living."); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740
(1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) ("Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away from
home, and family, and friends, and business, and property, and sent across the ocean to a
distant land, is punishment; and that oftentimes most severe and cruel."); United States
ex rel. Brancato v. Lehmann, 239 F.2d 663, 666 (6th Cir. 1956) ("Although it is not
penal in character . . . deportation is a drastic measure at times the equivalent of ban-
ishment or exile . . . ."). Perhaps the most poignant description comes from Judge
Learned Hand, who in United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630, 630-31 (2d
Cir. 1926) wrote:
However heinous his crimes, deportation is to him exile, a dreadful punishment,
abandoned by the common consent of all civilized peoples. Such, indeed, it
would be to any one, but to one already proved to be incapable of honest living,
a helpless waif in a strange land, it will be utter destruction. That our reason-
able efforts to rid ourselves of unassimilable immigrants should in execution be
attended by such a cruel and barbarous result would be a national reproach.
100. 686 F.2d at 38-39.
101. Id. at 39. Interestingly, the Russell court need not have addressed this ques-
tion, for it was able to resolve the case by finding a core violation of Rule 11 itself, which
requires that a defendant's plea be voluntary and not the product of misrepresentation by
the prosecution. In Russell, the prosecutor had explained to the court that the defendant
would not be subject to deportation if he pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor. Id. at 41.
Nevertheless, the Russell court chose to address specifically the interrelationship of Rule
11 to Rule 32(d) and the issue of manifest injustice as it relates to deportation conse-
quences. Id. at 40-41. See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1969) (mis-
representation included as a factor invalidating the voluntariness of a guilty plea); case
cited supra note 31.
102. 686 F.2d at 40-41.
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his innocence or a mere formal technicality of the rule's application.
The second is whether a withdrawal of the plea and a subsequent
trial would prejudice the government's case; for example, key gov-
ernment witnesses may no longer be available. Third is whether the
government had any role in contributing to the defendant's misun-
derstanding of the consequences. While this final point repeats the
already mandated non-misrepresentation on the part of the prosecu-
tion, further discussion by the Russell court reveals a willingness to
designate as a "manifest injustice" even an accused's simple un-
awareness of the deportation consequences of his plea.103
Additionally, the Russell court suggested that lower courts, in
considering withdrawal of pleas under Rule 32(d), should be sensi-
tive to the possibility that the defendant has not received effective
assistance of counsel.1 ' In contrast to Parrino and its progeny, the
Russell court questioned whether a defendant who enters a plea of
guilty is actually "voluntarily" waiving his right to trial by jury.
Such a defendant has a compelling reason to stand trial when all the
consequences of his plea are known; a plea is voluntary only when
such defendants know the "pandects under which they plead."105
"Pandects" thus supplants the traditional classification of "direct"
and "collateral" and includes, for this circuit at least, the conse-
quence of deportation.
The Russell court went even one step further in its dictum. Ac-
cepting the uniqueness of deportation among the consequences of
convictions, it questioned classifying deportation as a collateral con-
sequence, saying:
It is extremely troublesome that deportation has never been considered a
direct consequence of guilty pleas of the sort that must be brought to the
defendant's attention before his plea may be considered voluntary under
Rule 11. Aliens form a discrete, easily recognized class of defendants. They
are deported by the same branch of government that brings criminal
charges against them, and in many cases their deportation is a more direct
and automatic consequence of conviction than any other sanction. District
courts need to remember that although they are not required to explain the
possibility of deportation to alien defendants before accepting a plea under
103. Id. at 40. "Finally, although deportation is not a 'direct' consequence of a
plea for purposes of Rule 11, it is difficult to imagine a collateral consequence that would
be more compelling for purposes of showing the 'manifest injustice' required by Rule
32(d)." Id.
104. Id. at 40 n.6.
105. Id. at 42. See also C. WHITEHEAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS 410 (1980) ("Under the federal rule the judge is
not required to inform a defendant about these matters, but for a plea to be intelligently
given in any meaningful sense, it seems that all significant collateral consequences of the
plea should be mentioned.") (Emphasis added).
Rule 11, nothing prohibits them from doing so. The distribution of justice
to alien defendants can only be enhanced if the trial courts make sure such
defendants know the pandects under which they plead."6
Further Federal Erosion-Attorney Misinformation
Recent erosion of the Parrino tradition has also occurred in the
Fourth Circuit. In Strader v. Garrison,10 7 the defendant was mis-
informed by his attorney about the effect of a guilty plea upon his
parole eligibility date. Although parole is a collateral consequence,
the court considered defense counsel's failure to apprise his client
accurately of this eventuality to be a violation of his constitutional
right, and it expressly rebuffed the Sambro and Parrino holdings for
having ignored the constitutional issues involved. The court stated:
"We regard those cases [Sambro and Parrino] as aberrations. In
neither case was the problem approached in terms of the constitu-
tional entitlement to the effective assistance of counsel. 108 Strader
required the judgment of conviction to be vacated, when it was
shown, as here, that the guilty plea would never have been tendered
had the defendant been properly advised by his attorney.109 When
ignorance and misadvice by an accused's counsel improvidently lead
him to enter a plea of guilty, the appropriate remedy is withdrawal
of the plea.110 The Strader court also pointed out that the Second
Circuit itself came to the same conclusion in Hill v. Ternullo,111 not-
withstanding and without reference to Parrino, when it noted that
the defense counsel was so ineffective as to amount to a denial of the
constitutional right to counsel.11
STATE EXPANSION OF ALIEN'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Recent Statutory Trend
The status of the alien's right to be informed of possible deporta-
tion consequences is even more divergent among the states than it is
at the federal level. Strong evidence is appearing to indicate a trend
has begun on the state level to require warning defendants of possi-
ble deportation before courts accept guilty pleas. Since 1977 four
states have enacted statutes-strikingly similar in wording-requir-
ing the alien defendant to be advised of deportation consequences by
trial courts. These states are California (1977),13 Massachusetts
106. Id. at 41-42 (emphasis added).
107. 611 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1979).
108. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 65.
110. Id.
Ill. United States ex rel. Hill v. Ternullo, 510 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1975).
112. 611 F.2d at 64.
113. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5 (Deering 1983).
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(1978),114 Oregon (1979), 115 and Connecticut (1982).116 Typical of
the four is section 1016.5(a) of the California Penal Code, which
reads:
Prior to acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to any offense
punishable as a crime under state law . . . the court shall administer the
following advisement on the record to the defendant: If you are not a citi-
zen, you are hereby advised that conviction of the offense for which you
have been charged may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion
from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to
the laws of the United States.117
As the text of the statute indicates, the court is required to establish
in the record that such a warning has been given to the defendant.
Absent this record, the defendant is to be presumed not to have re-
ceived the required advisement."1
Three of these four statutes-California, Massachusetts and Con-
necticut-go further than Rule 11 by explicitly providing for a rem-
edy if the defendant is not given the warning by the court. Califor-
nia, for example, requires that when the defendant is not afforded
this warning and demonstrates that the conviction of the offense to
which he pleaded guilty or nolo contendere may have the conse-
quence of deportation, exclusion, or denial of naturalization, the
court shall, on his motion, vacate the judgment and permit the de-
fendant to withdraw the guilty plea and to enter one of not guilty.,,
114. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278 § 29D (West 1981).
115. OR. REV. STAT. § 135.385 (1981-1982).
116. CONN. LEGIS. SERV. § 82-177 (West 1982).
117. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5(a) (Deering 1983).
118. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5(b) (Deering 1983). A statement of legislative
intent is included in the statute. The statement is important for its understanding and
appreciation of the alien defendant's unique plight. It postulates that deportation is seri-
ous in nature, and that many aliens do, in fact, offer guilty pleas fully unaware of the
dire consequences of deportation. Subsection (d) of section 1016.5 of the California Pe-
nal Code provides in pertinent part:
The Legislature finds and declares that in many instances involving an individ-
ual who is not a citizen of the United States charged with an offense punishable
as a crime under state law, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is entered without
the defendant knowing that a conviction of such offense is grounds for deporta-
tion, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization
pursuant to the laws of the United States. Therefore, it is the intent of the
Legislature in enacting this section to promote fairness to such accused individu-
als by requiring in such cases that acceptance of a guilty plea or plea of nolo
contendere be preceded by an appropriate warning of the special consequences
for such a defendant which may result from the plea.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5(d) (Deering 1983).
119. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5(b). Connecticut and Massachusetts have identi-
cal provisions. See CONN. LEGIS. SERV. § 82-177(c) (West 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 278, § 29D (West 1981).
None of these statutes requires the defendant to make a claim of
innocence prior to withdrawing the guilty plea.120 In addition, each
of the three aforementioned statutes is drafted to avoid the danger of
opening a floodgate of post-sentence appeals or collateral attacks.
Although the statutes require the warning be given to each defen-
dant, a remedy is available solely to those defendants who would
actually be affected by one of the enumerated consequences. In prac-
tical terms, other non-alien defendants would have no basis for an
attack if the court were technically remiss in offering the required
advice.
The California case of People v. Gloria demonstrates this safe-
guard of judicial efficiency.1 21 Here, the defendant pleaded guilty
and then sought to have the judgment vacated because the court had
not informed him of the consequences under Penal Code section
1016.5. The court ruled that this provision did not apply to such a
defendant because he was not subject to deportation. In contrast, in
People v. Guzman, 22 the defendant had not been appropriately ad-
vised of the possible deportation consequences. Though the govern-
ment maintained the defendant failed to establish he would not have
pleaded guilty had he been aware of the consequences, it was held a
court cannot assume a defendant would or would not admit the truth
of the allegations were he properly advised of the consequences. In
this instance, there was no evidence that the defendant had been
given the required warning and it was clear he was deportable as a
consequence of his conviction. The defendant, therefore, was allowed
to withdraw his guilty plea and enter one of not guilty.123
Legal Dilemmas Avoided by Statutory Provisions
These state statutes provide significant safeguards to aliens who,
as the California Legislature noted, 24 frequently are unaware of de-
portation consequences of their plea. Judge Bazelon, in his Sambro
dissent, similarly urged protection of this group who, through igno-
120. E.g., Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927), which, on the
federal level, provides for withdrawal regardless of one's assertion of innocence:
But on timely application, the court will vacate a plea of guilty shown to have
been unfairly obtained or given through ignorance, fear or inadvertence. Such
an application does not involve any question of guilt or innocence.. . .The court
in exercise of its discretion will permit one accused to substitute a plea of not
guilty and have a trial if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair
and just.
(Footnotes omitted). See infra note 126 and accompanying text (Court's acceptance of
nolo contendere plea when defendant asserted innocence).
121. 108 Cal. App. 3d 50, 166 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1980).
122. 116 Cal. App. 3d 186, 172 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1981).
123. Id. at 192, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
124. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5(d) (Deering 1983). See supra note 118 for the
text of this section.
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rance of the laws and without fully understanding the consequences
of their actions, waive their rights; such typically poor and unedu-
cated people, he urged, are entitled to protection.125 Moreover, pro-
viding such critical information to this discrete class of persons re-
quires, at best, a mere few minutes of the court's time.
Other reasons exist, however, that warrant such statutory safe-
guards. For example in North Carolina v. Alford, the Court can-
didly conceded that it sometimes lies in one's best interest to plead
guilty while asserting innocence, and that a court's acceptance of
such a plea does not violate the defendant's right of due process
guaranteed by the Constitution. 26 The likelihood of a suspended
sentence might induce an alien to plead guilty or nolo contendere,
especially if he or she is unaware of deportation eventualities. 27 The
possibility thus arises that an alien-though innocent of any wrong-
doing-may be banished from his home for life as the result of a
plea, the ramifications of which he possessed little or no understand-
ing. Such eventualities must create serious misgivings about the vol-
untariness of a plea so offered.1 28
Exacerbating the entire dilemma for the alien, federal deportation
statute 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4), predicated upon "moral turpitude,"
does not indicate precisely what constitutes moral turpitude,1 29 leav-
125. United States v. Sambro, 455 F.2d 918, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting).
126. 400 U.S. 25 (1970). See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) in
which the court stated:
We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is compelled and invalid under
the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the defendant's desire to accept
the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of
possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty author-
ized by law for the crime charged.
Id. at 751. See also United States v. Bucio-Reyes, No. 80-3744, slip op. (6th Cir. June
11, 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 941 (1981) (the Court refused to reconsider the alien's
conviction which was based on a nolo contendere plea, although the defendant had as-
serted his innocence while offering the plea).
127. See supra note 9.
128. See generally Note, Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas under Rule 32(d), 64 YALE
L.J. 590 (1955).
[T]here still exists the possibility of a guilty plea being entered by an innocent
person relying on the security of a known outcome. This possibility is present
whether the mistake concerns 'collateral' or 'direct' consequences. When the ac-
cused can prove that his counsel made conclusive statements to him about mate-
rial consequences, it is reasonable to infer that these assertions were the cause of
the plea. Hence, if it develops that the lawyer was wrong, withdrawal should be
allowed.
Id. at 599 (footnotes omitted).
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1976). For a compilation of what has been construed
as a crime of moral turpitude, see IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION
ing considerable ambiguity as to which crimes may lead to deporta-
tion. An alien might conceivably plead guilty to a crime either he, or
his attorney, felt was not one of moral turpitude, only later to learn
that it had been so construed. In addition, whether a violation consti-
tutes moral turpitude is solely a federal question, not to be deter-
mined by state interpretation.130 Consequently, one must look to how
specific crimes have been defined in federal cases.131 This presents a
difficult task for the attorney. It is not, therefore, surprising that
alien defendants, as well as defense counsel-and even judges them-
selves-are frequently unaware of the deportation consequences that
may arise from a guilty plea. 3 2 It seems unfair to hold the alien to
such strict degrees of punishment when the legal system he en-
counters is fraught with such ambiguous complexities. Statutes, such
as those implemented by the aforementioned states, eliminate the
disturbing problems that arise from these gray areas of the legal
system.
An additional complication faced by the alien is the nolo con-
tendere plea. This plea is not regarded as an express admission of
guilt, but as a consent by the defendant to be punished as if he were
guilty; it is a prayer for leniency.1 33 For deportation purposes, how-
ever, the plea of nolo contendere is the equivalent of a guilty plea.13 4
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 4.14(a)-(e) (rev. ed. 1982).
130. See Hollander, supra note 4, 48-49.
131. id.
132. See Legomsky, supra note 50, at 105-06:
It is an anomaly of American immigration law that the sentencing judge-in
federal and state courts alike-frequently makes the real decision on whether an
alien convict is to be deported. Because the anomaly is largely unrecognized,
this decision is often made unwittingly, without regard to whether such a sanc-
tion is desirable in the individual case.
Professor Legomsky also points out that deportation law itself possesses anomalies that
are sometimes surprising, if not startling. For example, he notes, possession of one "joint
of marijuana" may lead to deportation, whereas a conviction for first degree murder may
not. Id. at 62 n.6. Bastone relates an equally troubling hypothetical situation:
[U]nder § 1251(a)(4) a non-citizen defendant convicted of a brutal rape-kid-
napping may not incur the collateral consequences of vulnerability to deporta-
tion . . . [while] another non-citizen defendant, after pleading nolo contendere
and being only minimally fined following each of two unsuccessful and unpre-
meditated attempts at shoplifting items of marginal value, could be the subject
of deportation proceedings, notwithstanding long-term residence and otherwise
exemplary conduct in the community.
Bastone, supra note 4 at 19.
133. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 36 n.8 (1970). Troublesome, too, is
that while Rule 11 (f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the court to
satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the guilty plea, it makes no such demand for
the acceptance of the plea of nolo contendere.
134. "It is settled that a plea of nolo contendere, when accepted by the court,
becomes for all practical purposes the full equivalent of a plea of guilty . . " In re
Fortis, 14 I. & N. Dec. 576, 577 (1974). See also Rubis-Rubio v. INS:
While it may be true . . . that a guilty judgment following a nolo contendere
plea cannot be used as an admission in a subsequent action, it has been held
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Difficulties can thus arise in this area depending on how a particular
state employs the plea. California, for example, provides that guilty
and nolo contendere pleas have the same legal effect in regard to
felonies, but when the charge is a non-felony, the plea cannot be
used against the defendant as an admission in any civil suit.135 This
can present a portentous conflict between jurisdictions, because an
alien defendant, as well as his counsel, might be induced to offer a
nolo contendere plea to a charge of some non-felony, in reliance on
the state statute ensuring no civil ramifications, such as deportation.
Nevertheless, the alien may be subject to a deportation proceeding,
because 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) becomes effective by virtue of a convic-
tion, regardless of whether it stems from a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere.'36 Again, the recent state statutes avoid this problem by
requiring the defendant charged with any crime to be notified of po-
tential deportation consequences whether offering a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere. The alien defendant is safeguarded from any fed-
eral contingency, known or unknown.
Expansion of Aliens' Due Process Rights by State Case Law
In addition to the growing legislative trend among states to pro-
vide alien defendants greater safeguards from the hazards of unex-
pected deportation, recent state case law also reflects a trend in
granting withdrawals of guilty pleas when the consequences of de-
portation were not known at the time the plea was offered. Parrino,
however, is still followed in some jurisdictions, and is relied on espe-
cially in those cases where deportation is not the actual consequence
at issue.137 In a 1972 Indiana case,138 for example, the defendant
that the conviction may be noticed for purposes of deportation where the fact of
the conviction is itself the only thing that is relevant.
380 F.2d 29, 29-30 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 944 (1976); Farrington v.
King, 128 F.2d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 1942). (Though the defendant alleged that he accom-
panied his plea of nolo contendere with an explanation that he was innocent of the
charge, the court held that the "plea of nolo contendere was, for all practical purposes,
the full equivalent of a plea of guilty"). See supra note 5 (guilty plea is a conviction).
135. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016 (Deering 1983).
136. See supra note 134 (nolo contendere as the equivalent of conviction for depor-
tation purposes).
137. See People v. Thomas, 42 Ili. 2d 122, 242 N.E.2d 177 (1968) (addressing
specifically the failure of a judge to inform the defendant that his conviction would de-
prive him of the right to vote and hold public office); Reponte v. State, 57 Hawaii 354,
556 P.2d 577 (1976) (defendant unaware at the time of his plea that he would thereby
lose the right to hunt or hold a gun).
138. Lovera v. People, 152 Ind. App. 377, 283 N.E.2d 795 (1972); accord People
v. Garcia, 53 Misc. 2d 303, 279 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1967).
pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana and was sentenced to five
days in jail and fined $300. Although the trial court judge himself
admitted that he was unaware that deportation would follow the de-
fendant's conviction,1 39 the court ruled that a trial judge has neither
an obligation to determine that a defendant is an alien nor to advise
him of the effect of his plea regarding deportation.140
One of the strongest positions taken among the states (along with
an equally forceful dissent) is Tafoya v. State.141 In deciding
whether to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea because
of his unawareness of the deportation consequences at the time the
plea was made, the Alaska court in this case followed Parrino, hold-
ing deportation to be merely a collateral consequence. The defen-
dant's ignorance of this consequence did not render his plea void.142
The court also addressed the question of whether the defense attor-
ney's failure to inform the accused of the potential deportation con-
stituted a deprivation of effective counsel such as is guaranteed by
the Constitution. In contrast to a similar and more recent Penn-
sylvania decision, 43 the Alaska court agreed with the majority of the
federal circuits that the failure of counsel to inform the accused of
possible deportation did not constitute a denial of the right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel. 144 The applicable standard in determining
whether the defendant has had effective counsel, the court asserted,
was whether the counsel was so incompetent as to make the trial a
mockery and a farce. Only then Would the defendant be entitled to a
new trial.'45
Judge Rabinowitz, agreeing with Judge Frank, strongly dissented
on two major issues: First, he rebutted the view that deportation was
"only" a collateral consequence; and second, he expressed satisfac-
tion that under the circumstances of this case, the "manifest injus-
tice" criterion of Rule 32(d) had been met. 40 He felt the defendant
Tafoya would not have pled guilty to the charge of rape had counsel
advised him that he was deportable by virtue of his plea. 47 He also
139. If judges themselves are unaware of deportation consequences, it is not sur-
prising that attorneys, not to mention their clients, are also frequently unaware. On the
one hand this supports the position that judges can't be accountable to foresee such re-
mote consequences-at least from their perspective; on the other hand, it demonstrates
the necessity of compelling dissemination of such critical information. The resolution
must center around the quintessential issue of the voluntariness of the alien defendant's
plea.
140. 152 Ind. App. at 379, 283 N.E.2d at 798.
141. 500 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973).
142. Id. at 250-51.
143. Commonwealth v. Wellington, 451 A.2d 223 (Pa. Super. 1982).
144. 500 P.2d at 252.
145. Id. at 251.
146. Id. at 254 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting). Alaska's Criminal Rule 32(d) is iden-
tical to Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 253 n.3.
147. Id. at 255.
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posited what the District of Columbia Circuit later pronounced in
Russell and what state court decisions have recently held, namely,
that though a court's failure to advise a defendant of deportation
consequences does not technically violate Rule 11, there need be no
violation of this rule to invoke Rule 32(d). 148
The two most recent state decisions dealing with notification to
aliens of the consequences of their pleas reflect the reasoning of the
Russell court and mark a dramatic turn from the Parrino holdings.
In Commonwealth v. Wellington, 49 the Pennsylvania court conceded
that a trial judge has no obligation to advise a defendant of the col-
lateral consequences, and thus on this basis a plea could not be with-
drawn. However, when defense counsel fails to advise the accused of
such a consequence, a plea is not knowingly and intelligently offered.
Describing deportation as a significant consequence of certain con-
victions, this court explained, "Counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to
advise a defendant before a guilty plea of the significant legal conse-
quences may therefore require that the plea be withdrawn."
1 5 0
This holding does not compel a trial court itself to inform an ac-
cused of the deportation consequences; rather, it considers this to be
the obligation of defendant's counsel.1 51 Lack of such information,
this Pennsylvania court asserts, affects the voluntariness of the
alien's plea, as well as denies him the constitutionally guaranteed
effective assistance of counsel. Consequently, breach of this duty by
defense counsel requires the guilty plea to be withdrawn.' 52 The
practical effect of this holding, then, logically suggests that a guilty
plea offered by a defendant alien unaware of deportation conse-
quences-albeit as a result of his own counsel's ineffectivenss-is
148. Judge Rabinowitz asserted:
While there may be considerabie overlap, the concept of 'manifest injustice'
under Rule 32(d) permits the judge greater latitude than the requirements of
constitutional 'due process.' The facts disclosed in a hearing might not be suffi-
cient for the court to conclude that the guilty plea was involuntary and violative
of due process, yet the court may be of the opinion that clear'injustice was done.
Id. at 255 n.7 (quoting Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204, 209 (4th Cir. 1963))
(footnotes omitted).
149. 451 A.2d 223, 224 (Pa. Super. 1982).
150. Id. at 224.
151. Id. at 225.
152. The Wellington court stated:
Consequently, we now hold that counsel has a duty to an alien client to inquire
and advise her of the possible deportation consequences of a contemplated plea.
Because counsel's failure to undertake such actions could have no reasonable
basis designed to effectuate appellant's interests he was ineffective, and appel-
lant must be permitted to withdraw her guilty plea.
Id. (citations omitted).
rendered invalid because involuntarily made.
In a 1981 Florida case, Edwards v. State,153 the court took this
same position. Here the defendant claimed his plea of guilty was
involuntary because (1) the trial judge had failed to inform him of
possible deportation, and (2) his attorney had failed to advise him of
such consequences. Relying on Fruchtman and Michel, the Florida
court here, too, held that the trial court is not required to advise the
defendant of federal consequences before accepting a guilty plea.
However, a court could not accept a plea that is not offered volunta-
rily and knowingly, "that is, upon advice which enables the accused
to make an informed, intelligent, and conscious choice to plead
guilty or not. ' ' 154 The court in Edwards emphasized that for a waiver
of constitutional rights to be acceptable, the plea must be made with
an awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely result.155 It
then concluded that "ignorance of the potential consequences of de-
portation cannot, in our view, make for an intelligent waiver.M56
This view comports fully with the mandates of Kercheval1 57 and
Boykin 58 that a defendant be made aware of the implications and
153. Edwards v. State, 393 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1981).
154. Id. at 599.
155. Id. The Edwards dissent accurately pointed out that by requiring counsel to
advise the client of deportation possibilities, it, in effect, places the burden back upon the
court to be satisfied that the defendant has been so advised, since if the defense attorney
is remiss in his obligation, the judgment becomes subject to appeal or collateral attack.
The point is well taken. Judicial efficiency speaks in favor of a rule requiring the court to
inform the defendant of such consequences prior to accepting the plea, for as courts
increasingly allow withdrawal of pleas under Rule 32(d), the frequency of collateral at-
tacks necessarily increases. In California, for example, prior to the legislative enactment
requiring courts to advise defendant aliens of deportation consequences, the state su-
preme court held the lack of defendant's awareness of potential deportation to be grounds
for withdrawing the earlier plea. In People v. Giron, the California Supreme Court held
that a court could grant a motion to withdraw a plea when justice would be promoted:
"[W]here an extrinsic fact operated so as to cause an over-reaching of the free will and
judgment of the accused so as to deny him a trial on the merits. . . the court may, even
after judgment, permit him to withdraw the plea and stand trial." 11 Cal. 3d 793, 797
n.5, 523 P.2d 636, 639, n.5, 114 Cal. Rptr. 596, 599 n.5 (1974) (quoting People v. Savin,
37 Cal. App. 2d 105, 108, 98 P.2d 773, 774 (1940)). The Giron court also recognized
that ignorance about deportation consequences was a constriction of the defendant's vol-
untary plea, saying, "As a general rule, a plea of guilty may be withdrawn for mistake,
ignorance or inadvertence or any other factor over-reaching the defendant's free and
clear judgment." Id. at 797, 523 P.2d at 639, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 599. See also People v.
Wiedersperg, 44 Cal. App. 3d 550, 118 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1975) (withdrawal of the plea
granted because both counsel and court were unaware of the deportation potentiality);
but cf. People v. Flores, 38 Cal. App. 3d 484, 113 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1974) (no abuse of
discretion); People v. Martinez, 154 Cal. App. 2d 233, 316 P.2d 14 (1957) (due process
met, defendant fully represented by counsel, court had no responsibility to see that ac-
cused received sound advice from his attorney).
156. 393 So. 2d at 599. "While we may not impose upon the trial court the obliga-
tion to advise the accused of this consequence because 'collateral,' its 'collateralness' is
immaterial in measuring the effective assistance of counsel." Id.
157. See supra text accompanying note 21 and note 22.
158. See supra text accompanying note 25.
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consequences of his guilty plea, thereby facilitating the constitution-
ally guaranteed voluntariness of that plea.
CONCLUSION
The standard to be applied in the United States to alien defen-
dants who offer pleas of guilty or nolo contendere while unaware of
possible deportation consequences is unsettled. While some disagree-
ment exists as to its nature, it is mere rhetoric to deny the penal
aspect of deportation. All, in fact, do agree that the ultimate conse-
quences of deportation are often considerably more severe than the
actual punishment meted out by the trial court. Deportation can and
does have a most devastating impact not only on the alien himself,
but also on spouses, children, relatives, friends, and on other ancil-
lary benefits such as employment, property, responsibilities, and con-
tract benefits and obligations. Indeed, possibly the most traumatic
impact is the deprivation of what to the alien has become home and
fatherland.
The major objection to providing the alien defendant with notice
regarding possible deportation appears to be the fear of burdening
trial courts by requiring them to inform defendants of numerous and
often unforeseeable collateral consequences.159 There is, of course,
considerable merit to these fears, for the entire gamut of collateral
consequences is certainly not ascertainable. Deportation, however, is
not only ascertainable, it is a common and predictable eventuality,
singular in import among the various collateral consequences. In the
words of Judge Learned Hand, it would be a "national reproach"1 60
not to make this distinction.
Requiring courts to advise alien defendants of possible deportation
would not impinge on judicial efficiency; rather it would enhance it
by reducing the number of potential collateral attacks. The United
States Supreme Court in McCarthy v. United States emphasized
this by remarking: "Thus the more meticulously the Rule [Rule 1 1]
is adhered to, the more it tends to discourage, or at least to enable
more expeditious disposition of, the numerous and often frivolous
159. Joseph v. Esperdy, 267 F. Supp. 492, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) reflects this in
summation: "[l]t seems onerous and absurd to expect a judge to explain to each and
every defendant who pleads guilty the full range of collateral consequences of his plea,
and indeed, to anticipate what those collateral consequences are." The Cariola court in
United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 182 (3d Cir. 1963), echoes a similar fear when it
decried placing burdensome demands on the trial courts requiring clairvoyance of a su-
perhuman kind. See supra note 61.
160. See supra note 99.
post-conviction attacks on the constitutional validity of guilty
pleas." 16'
In reality, very little court time is required to advise a defendant
of the pertinent consequences of his plea.162 The McCarthy Court
stressed: "It is, therefore, not too much to require that, before sen-
tencing defendants to years of imprisonment, district judges take the
few minutes necessary to inform them of their rights and to deter-
mine whether they understand the action they are taking.""1 3
The recently enacted statutes by California, Oregon, Massachu-
setts and Connecticut, as well as the increasing number of judicial
decisions, both state and federal, reflect a growing willingness to ex-
tend to the alien defendant a due process that is more appropriate to
his unique plight. From the standpoint of fairness and justice this is
a commendable and necessary trend. Both judicial efficiency and the
special circumstances presented by the alien defendant call for a na-
tional standard for determining the voluntariness of entering a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere--one that is not enmeshed in the defini-
tional confusion of directness and collateralness. Courts should be
required to make the relatively simple effort of assuring themselves
that the alien understands that deportation may result from his plea,
thereby mooting the controversy surrounding the nebulous concepts
of manifest injustice and effective assistance of counsel. Only then
can an alien's plea be regarded as voluntary.
DAVID M. MCKINNEY
161. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969).
162. Proposed Amendments to Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.
188 (1974) (Statement of Herbert Semmell, on behalf of the Nat'l Assn. of Criminal
Defense Lawyers and the Wash. Council of Lawyers). "The entire process [Rule 11
warnings] usually takes about five minutes, particularly if the defense counsel has dis-
cussed these matters with his client in advance of the hearings .. .
163. 394 U.S. at 472.
